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Abstract—In the context of increasing decentralised electricity
generation, this paper evaluates the effect of different regulatory
frameworks on the evolution of distribution networks. This
problem is addressed by means of agent based modelling in which
the interactions between the agents of a distribution network,
and an environment are described. The consumers and the
distribution system operator are the agents, which act in an
environment that is composed by a set of rules. For a given
environment, we can simulate the evolution of the distribution
network by computing the actions of the agents at every time step
of a discrete time dynamical system. We assume the electricity
consumers are rational agents that may deploy distributed energy
installations. The deployment of such installations may alter the
remuneration mechanism of the distribution system operator. By
modelling this mechanism, we may compute the evolution of the
electricity distribution tariff in response to the deployment of
distributed generation.
Index Terms—agent based modelling, distribution networks,
distributed generation integration, power system economics
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary enablers of the energy transition is
the widespread growth in the integration of distributed en-
ergy resources (DER) into the electricity mix [1]. For this
reason, distributed generating technologies as, for example,
solar photovoltaic (PV), have been (and are being) globally
stimulated by means of policies and directives in order to
foster their deployment (see for instance the European Par-
liament Directive 2009/28/EC [2]). These policies are usually
translated into different incentive mechanisms, such as feed-
in tariffs (FiT), feed-in premiums (FiP), or other monetary
aids which help improve the business models of DER as gen-
erating technologies. Along with the incentive mechanisms,
there are several indirect key drivers of DER deployment.
Two such drivers are the distribution tariff design (which for
simplicity will be called tariff design in this paper), and the
technology costs. Regarding the former, they are typically
regulated by the incumbent regulatory authority, which can
be regional or national. As for the technology costs, over the
last few years these have been decreasing, and according to the
projections, they may still progressively decrease during the
coming decade, owing to economy of scales and technological
maturity [3]. All these factors combined and, in particular,
the widespread use of incentive mechanisms, have contributed
to a substantial deployment of DER; however, such a DER
integration might conceal the potential to create both technical
problems (e.g. under- and over-voltages) [4] and regulatory
challenges (e.g. cross-subsidisation amongst electricity con-
sumers) [5]–[7].
These regulatory challenges are multifaceted, and notably
comprise, amongst others: (i) equity problems derived from
an unfair allocation of the electricity distribution costs, which
may lead to cross-subsidies amongst the consumers of the
distribution networks [6]; (ii) the potential failure of the dis-
tribution system operators (DSOs) remuneration mechanisms
[5]; or (iii) a generalised increase in the distribution tariff [8],
i.e. the distribution component of the overall retail electricity
price, the price end consumers are exposed to, which is
composed of energy costs, transmission costs, distribution
costs, taxes, and the retailer margin.
The scope of this paper is to quantitatively assess the nature
and extent of these regulatory challenges, making use of a
simulation environment to evaluate how the deployment of
substantial amounts of DER may alter the remuneration mech-
anisms of DSOs and how this, in turn, may have an impact on
the distribution tariffs. In particular, we propose a methodology
to compute the impact of different regulatory frameworks
on the agents of a distribution network. Furthermore, in our
methodology we move beyond a steady-state analysis in which
the variables of the system (e.g. deployed DER, or technology
costs) are fixed, to a dynamical system approach by which
each variable evolves over time, rendering different states of
the system at every evaluated time-step. In this context, the
complete evolution of the system can be computed by fixing
the set of rules (i.e. the regulatory framework) controlling
the interactions between the variables. The regulatory frame-
work describes the distribution tariff design, the remuneration
mechanism of the DSO, the incentive mechanisms, and the
technology costs. Finally, this methodology enables employing
different regulatory frameworks, allowing for testing the short
to middle run effects of distinct regulatory practices on the
distribution networks and their agents.
For the remainder of the paper, Section II documents
previous works dealing with the regulatory challenges posed
by a large integration of DER. Section III introduces a high
level description of the simulator. Section IV explains how the
regulatory framework (composed of tariff design and incentive
mechanism) is modelled. Section V exhibits a case study
in which we make use of the developed simulator. Finally,
Section VI concludes and exposes the limitations of our
approach.
II. RELATED WORKS
Studying the regulatory challenges existing in distribution
networks is not novel, as the available literature reveals. In
one of the first research papers on this topic [9], the authors
identify two main elements to regulate: setting the distribution
tariff allocating the total costs among all the users, and estab-
lishing an adequate remuneration mechanism for the DSO.
Moreover, they propose a remuneration mechanism based on
a revenue limitation scheme, as previously described in [10].
The two first documents dealing with the issue of distributed
generation (DG) in distribution networks are [11] and [12].
The former focuses on the impact of DG on the power systems,
while the latter discusses the effects of regulation on the
deployment of DG. The concept of DG as generating technolo-
gies, generally of reduced installed capacity, and connected
to the distribution networks is introduced in [13], where the
authors showcase different DG technologies and their different
costs. As mentioned in the introduction, the foremost drivers
of DG integration (in which DER are included) are identified.
Two of them are the distribution tariff design on the one hand,
and the use of incentive mechanisms on the other hand. The
existing literature can be divided accordingly.
A. Distribution Tariff Design
Concerning distribution tariff design, most of the existing
literature focuses on exploring how distribution costs should
be charged to end consumers. A series of rules for the design
of distribution tariffs can be found in [14], as well as in
the CEER report [15]. According to these works, the design
of a tariff should account for the choice of remuneration
mechanisms, the tariff structure, and the allocation of allowed
costs. Furthermore, the key regulatory principles to design
a tariff are identified, e.g. sustainability, non-discriminatory
access, efficiency, transparency, or tariff additivity. These
principles are, by and large, shared in [16], [17], where
relevant regulatory principles are listed. In [18], the authors
recommend that DG (both DER and combined heat and power)
pay regulated shallow connection costs in order to facilitate
the integration of these generation resources. The discussion
shallow vis--vis deep connection costs is also addressed in [7],
[19]–[23], where diverse methodologies are assessed. In short,
deep connection costs comprise the connection cost itself as
well as the costs derived from reinforcing the network, and
shallow connection costs consist only of the connection cost
whereas the potential costs of reinforcing the network are
socialised via the distribution tariff. Some of the existing works
experiment with different distribution tariff designs, looking
into their impact on DG and on the DSO ability to recover
its costs. In this regard, the authors in [24] explore designs
based on the cost-causality principle, claiming that such tariffs
function better than average cost distribution tariffs to recover
fixed network costs. In [16], the authors suggest a method to
assign costs according to the same principle, based on peak
demand, overall energy demand, and geographical location.
Moreover, in this work it is highlighted that, since consumers
may react to the tariffs, setting an adequate tariff might be
an iterative process. In [25], the researchers propose a way
of taking into consideration the impact of DG on the cost-
causality criterion used to design and compute distribution
tariffs. In these studies, different technologies are mentioned
for measuring the energy consumption and production of the
DER installation, namely net-metering and net-billing.
• Net-metering (NM): consists of one meter that records
imports (DER← Grid) by running forwards, and exports
(DER → Grid) by running backwards. Therefore, both
directions are assigned with the same monetary value,
namely the retail electricity tariff. Additionally, if the
exports exceed the imports, the excess is not remunerated.
• Net-billing (NB), also called net purchase and sale: con-
sists of two independent meters for imports and exports,
in this setting imports are charged at retail price, and
exports are compensated at a selling price. There is, in
principle, no limit to the amount of exports allowed.
Several authors have discussed the impact of these two sys-
tems. In [26], a model to evaluate the impact of NM policies in
introduced, concluding that this system is extremely beneficial
for consumers owners of a DER installation (prosumers), but
may create macroeconomic problems such as the increase
of the distribution tariff. Similar analyses are conducted in
[5], [27] where the authors compare NM with NB, claiming
that NM may lead to both cross-subsidies amongst the users
of a distribution network and an uncontrolled increase in
distribution prices, also known as the death spiral of the
utility [8], [27]. Analogous conclusions are drawn by [6],
where the authors state that NM presents a trade-off between
incentivising DG and securing the financial stability of the
DSO. In [28], [29], NM in the United States is analysed,
this papers suggest that NM enhances the value if behind-
the-meter, additionally they claim that the potential feedback
created by NM (i.e. the utility death spiral) is rather modest.
Another way of spurring the deployment of DER installa-
tions is by introducing changes in the method used to charge
consumers and prosumers for their electricity consumption.
Various methods have been explored in all the previous works,
e.g. capacity or demand tariffs (e/kW), volumetric tariffs
(e/kWh), fixed tariffs (e/connection), or time-of-use (ToU)
tariffs. In this regard, the analysis in [30] shows that when
applying volumetric distribution charges, in a setting where
NM is in place, an increase in the distribution tariff leads to
household PV deployment. In [31], the author demonstrates
that a peak demand capacity tariff is more efficient and cost-
reflective than its volumetric counterpart.
B. Incentive Mechanisms
Concerning incentive mechanisms (or support schemes),
several authors have examined the effect of FiTs. In [32]
FiTs are compared with traditional schemes such as renewable
obligations, proposing a two-part FiT with capacity and energy
payments which the authors claim to be a more effective
framework for fostering the deployment of DER than the
existing alternatives. The authors in [33] review the regulatory
and policy frameworks of FiT schemes, laying stress on how
these have affected the solar PV market. They highlight that,
due to generous tariffs the market bloomed in 2008, neverthe-
less, FiTs have failed to continue supporting PV integration
since they tend to distort the electricity prices leading to
economic instability. On the same topic, [34] shows that FiTs
are likely to work better than quantity-based systems (e.g.
quota-obligation) when it comes to fostering DER.
In addition, a few works can be found assessing the use
of incentive mechanisms to promote the deployment of DER,
for a range of different tariff designs. For example, in [35],
[36] the authors analyse the use of FiTs in combination with
NM and with NB. However, the results of these studies are
inconclusive insofar as they greatly depend on the initial
conditions (e.g. level of DER penetration, or distribution
prices).
C. Modelling
To date, the level of modelling in all these analyses is
rather limited owing to the complexity of representing ab-
stract regulatory principles in an exact manner. Furthermore,
modelling the behaviour of prosumers is complex since they
may not act rationally. For these reasons, in most of the
existing literature, the penetration of DER as well as the
distribution prices are considered parameters to study with
little or no interaction between them. There are some works,
nonetheless, where this is addressed. In [37], the authors
highlight the importance of designing efficient distribution
charges in the context of increasing DER integration, claiming
that the network peak is the main driver of network investment.
A model is introduced in this paper in which users can react to
distribution charges by deploying fix-sized DER installations
in order to overcome high distribution charges. Moreover, in
[38], a model of interaction between prosumers and DSO is
proposed comparing NM with NB; in this model, prosumers
react to distribution prices by deploying optimally sized DER
installations, the tariff is then updated by the DSO, responding
to a change in energy consumption. In [39] a model including
capacity charges and injection fees is proposed, concluding
that transitioning to rate structures including capacity charges
will not disrupt the adoption of PV and will lower the costs
of consumers. Finally, in [40] a game-theoretical model is
proposed to assess volumetric and capacity tariffs, their impact
on the potential prosumers, and the consequences for the
consumers.
D. Motivation
As we can see, some of the questions proposed in our paper
have been to some extent studied in the previous literature, al-
though from a purely qualitative standpoint. Only a few works
exist tackling this issue from a more quantitative perspective,
using mathematical tools to simulate the behaviour of end-
users in a distribution network and, although with limitations,
to estimate the repercussions of such behaviours for the
distribution networks and, in particular, for the distribution
tariff. Our research paper stands on the shoulders of all these
works, proposing a methodology to quantify the development
of distribution networks across time, as a function of the DER
deployment and the distribution tariff evolution. Furthermore,
an interaction between DER deployment and distribution rates
is modelled by which they impact one another and evolve over
time, attaining –or not– an equilibrium after the simulation
is completed (the horizon is reached). Our work includes the
analysis of several distribution tariff structures (volumetric fees
and capacity fees), as well as different incentive mechanisms
(NM and NB), in a simulation environment in which the
actors are residential consumers some of which may become
prosumers, and the DSO.
III. SIMULATOR
The simulator introduced in this section relies on ABM.
It allows modelling every consumer/prosumer of the DN
as a rational agent, who may deploy an optimally sized
DER installation if it is cost-efficient compared to the retail
prices. Furthermore, the DSO is also modelled as an agent
that can adjust the distribution tariff to recover its costs of
providing the distribution service. To assess the evolution of
the DN, we introduce a discrete time dynamical system that
enables computing the actions of the agents at every time
step. Finally, to compare different regulatory frameworks, we
introduce the concept of environment, which includes all of
the rules characterising them. In our simulator, the agents
interact (perform actions) within a particular environment. By
modifying the environment, we also modify the actions of the
agents, allowing the assessment of the DN evolution under
different regulatory frameworks.
A. Environment representation
Every environment is built with three distinct elements: (i)
tariff design, (ii) incentive mechanism, and (iii) technology
costs (assumed linearly decreasing over time).
We introduce two types of tariff designs:
• variable (volumetric): the electricity trades are associated
with a price per volume of energy in e/kWh; and
• variable (volumetric) + fixed (capacity): the electricity
trades are associated with a price per volume of energy
in e/kWh, and capacity contracts in e/kWp.
Furthermore, we include two different incentive mechanisms
for the consumers to deploy DER:
• NM: consisting of one meter that records imports (DER
← Grid) by running forwards, and exports (DER →
Grid) by running backwards. Therefore, both directions
are assigned with the same monetary value, namely the
retail electricity tariff. Additionally, if the exports exceed
the imports, the excess is not remunerated; and
• NB: consisting of two independent meters for imports
and exports, in this setting imports are charged at retail
price, and exports are compensated at a selling price.
B. Actions of the agents
There are two types of agents:
1) Consumers: at the beginning of the simulation they sim-
ply draw electricity from the DN. However, as the simulation
proceeds over the discrete time dynamical system, they take
actions to gradually deploy optimally sized DER installations,
becoming prosumers. The prosumers may draw (import) and
inject (export) electricity to the DN. To model the planning
and operation of these agents, i.e. the computation of their
electricity trades (imports and exports), and the transition
consumer → prosumer (DER deployment), we resort to an
optimisation framework instantiated as a mixed integer linear
program (MILP). This MILP is loosely based on the LP found
in [41], and aims at minimising the levelized cost of electricity
(LCOE) of the DER installation.
2) DSO: the actions of this agent consist in adjusting the
distribution tariff according to the environment in place. For
example, after collecting revenues, this agent may increase or
decrease the distribution tariff, under the assumption that it
must break-even. The DSO cannot modify the tariff design,
since this is imposed by the environment. Hence, if the tariff
design set by the environment consists of a fully volumetric
distribution tariff, the DSO will be able to adjust the price
per kWh, but it will not be able to recover costs by applying
capacity charges (e/kWp) to the DN consumers. The operation
of this agent is modelled with its remuneration mechanism.
C. Discrete time dynamical system
The actions of the agents lead to the evolution of the DN.
The consumers, by deploying DER, reduce their dependency
on the DN, lowering their apparent consumption, which refers
to the energy recorded by the meter at the end of the billing
period. In response to the consumers actions, the DSO will
adjust the distribution tariff according to its remuneration
mechanism. Thus, we can compute the DN evolution as a
function of the agents actions, by evaluating them at every
time step of a discrete time dynamical system.
Let n ∈ N denote the time index of the discrete time dy-
namical system, with N = {0, . . . , N−1}. At every time step
n, our simulator computes the actions of the agents, controlling
the transition from n to n + 1. This computation follows a
specific order: (1) the transition consumer → prosumer is
calculated, determining their apparent consumption Ξn; (2)
the DSO adjusts the distribution tariff Π(dis)n . In Figure 1, a
time-line of the discrete time dynamical system can be found.
The first billing period is necessary so that the consumers
can observe their electricity bill under the initial conditions.
Then, the transition consumer → prosumer can be computed,
and from it, we determine the total apparent consumption
Ξn+1 (which corresponds to the period n + 1 to n + 2).
Since the consumption during the period n to n + 1 and



























Fig. 1. Time-line of the discrete time dynamical system. The simulation
starts by assuming a distribution tariff Π(dis)n . Then, at every time step,
there is a transition consumer → prosumer leading to a change in the
aggregated apparent consumption Ξn. This change induces an adjustment
of the distribution tariff Π(dis)n .
the distribution tariff does not change (Π(dis)n ≡ Π(dis)n+1 ).
However, once Ξn+1 is computed, it induces a change in the
distribution tariff for the following period Π(dis)n+2 (after the
DSO observation of its revenue during the period n + 1 to
n+ 2). We assume that the consumers can react immediately
to this distribution tariff adjustment since they already have
knowledge regarding their consumption. Then, the aggregated
apparent consumption Ξn+2 can be calculated. The discrete
time dynamical system continues in this fashion until no
more consumers can turn into prosumers, or until the stopping
criteria are met: when reaching the finite time horizon N , or
when the DER are not economically profitable .
Every time step of the discrete time dynamical system,
except for the first one, is computed with one run of our
simulator. Thus, the developed simulator is run recursively
to simulate the complete dynamical system. The end of one
run will be used as starting point for the next one. The flow
diagram representing an outline of one run of the simulator
can be found in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of the proposed multi-agent simulator. The flow of
actions occurs from left to right. The DN consumers undergo individual MILP
optimisations to minimise their LCOEs. A transition consumer → prosumer
is computed (investment decision tab (yellow) on the Figure), and finally the
DSO adjusts the distribution tariff.
The simulation starts with a pool of consumers who may
become prosumers at any point of our discrete time dynamical
system. These agents, characterised by their load, are modelled
through an MILP to plan and operate a DER installation
minimising their LCOEs. Such an optimisation requires the
retail electricity price at each time step, as well as the demand
profile of the consumers. After the optimisation, a transition
consumer→ prosumer is computed by comparing the costs of
the consumers with and without DER installation. The aggre-
gated apparent consumption Ξn is then calculated and added
to the residual demand of the system (those consumers of the
DN who cannot deploy DER due to technical or economic
constraints). Finally, the DSO revenues are computed, and,
assuming constant costs across the discrete time dynamical
system, the distribution tariff Π(dis)n for the following time
step is determined so as to fully recover those costs.
IV. MODELLING OF THE SIMULATOR
In this simulator we introduce the concept of environment
as the container of the set of rules that characterise the
DN, namely the tariff design, the incentive mechanism, and
the technology costs. Hence, to model the agents actions,
we must take into account the distinct possible environ-
ments. Every single agent take individual actions, therefore,
we need to introduce the set I = {1, . . . , I} representing
the consumers/prosumers, where I is the number of con-
sumers/prosumers. In the following, we present the differences
in the simulator, depending on the tariff design and the
incentive mechanism.
A. Tariff design
We may use a fully volumetric design, or a two-part design
with a variable (volumetric) and a fixed (capacity) term.
1) Fully volumetric: under this setting, the individual elec-
tricity costs ψi,n of the agents in I are calculated as follows:






where ξi,n represents the individual apparent consumption of
the ith prosumer at the nth time step, Π(dis)n is the distribution
tariff set by the DSO, and Π(en) represents the costs of energy,
transmission and taxes, held constant across the simulation.
The DSO revenues are calculated as:
∀n ∈ N Rn = Π(dis)n · (Ω + Ξn) (2)
with Ω being the residual demand of the system (held con-
stant), and Ξn is the aggregated apparent consumption of the
consumers/prosumers, which is calculated as Ξn =
∑I
i=1 ξi,n
2) Two part: in this case we introduce a capacity term in the
calculations. The electricity costs of the consumers/prosumers
are calculated as follows:






where the term ci is set at the beginning of the simulation (see
equation (8)) and kept constant. As for the DSO, its revenues
are computed as follows:
∀n ∈ N Rn = Π(dis)n · (Ω + Ξn) + C (4)
where C =
∑(I+J)
i=1 ci, with J being the amount of consumers
who make up the residual demand Ω.
B. Incentive mechanism
We may use NM and NB. This choice impacts the individual
apparent consumption, and as such, the aggregated one.
1) NM: the individual apparent consumption of the con-
sumers/prosumers is given by:









where ρ(−)i,n and ρ
(+)
i,n are, respectively, the imports and exports
of the ith prosumer at the nth time step.
2) NB: in this case, the exports do not affect the apparent
consumption, thus:
∀i, n ∈ I ×N ξi,n = ρ(−)i,n (6)
For every option of tariff design and incentive mechanism,
the remuneration mechanism of the DSO is given by:
∀n ∈ N Π(dis)n+1 =
Θ + ∆n − C
Ω + Ξn
(7)
where Θ are the costs of the DSO, which are calculated as the
revenues of the first time step R0, and held constant across the
dynamical system. The imbalance from the previous period is
introduced with the difference ∆n = Θ−Rn.
V. CASE STUDY
To assess the impact of different environments on the DN
evolution, we introduce a case study in which we compare nine
different environments (regulatory frameworks). The simulator
necessitates a set of consumers/prosumers I to work. Each
consumer/prosumer is characterised by a demand profile and
a production profile. To generate demand profiles we use the
CREST model [42], whereas to generate production profiles
we use the python library PVLIB [43]. Once we have produced
the set I, we evaluate: (i) four different tariff designs, and (ii)
five different incentive mechanisms (Table I).
TABLE I
ENVIRONMENTS TO EVALUATE DIFFERENT TARIFF DESIGNS (E1 - E4)
AND DIFFERENT INCENTIVE MECHANISMS (E5 - E10)
Environment Tariff Design Incentive mechanism
E1. 100% vol. NB with selling price = 0.04e
E2. 75% vol. & 25% cap. NB with selling price = 0.04e
E3. 50% vol. & 50% cap. NB with selling price = 0.04e
E4. 25% vol. & 75% cap. NB with selling price = 0.04e
E5. 100% vol. NM
E6. 100% vol. NB with selling price = 0.04e
E7. 100% vol. NB with selling price = 0.06e
E8. 100% vol. NB with selling price = 0.08e
E9. 100% vol. NB with selling price = 0.10e
For all of the environments we set the value of Π(en) to
0.132e/kWh. Furthermore, we assume an initial distribution
tariff Π(dis)n of 0.088e/kWh (making an equivalent retail price
of 0.22e/kWh). To determine two-part tariffs (E2 - E4), we
compute:
∀i ∈ I ci =








where η is the desired percentage (see table I), and γi,n is an
adjustment factor applied depending on the peak demand of
the consumer/prosumer. In this case study γi = 1 (constant),
since all of the consumers/prosumers feature a similar peak.
A. Results
To represent the DN evolution for each environment we rely
on four metrics: (i) the evolution of the variable (volumetric)
term of the distribution tariff, (ii) the penetration of DER
relative to the maximum potential I , (iii) the actual deployed
PV and battery capacity (in kWp and kWh), and (iv) the LCOE
of the deployed DER installations (in e/kWh).












































































Fig. 3. Evolution of Π(dis)n (upper two figures) and of the DER adoption
(lower two figures) across the discrete time dynamical system, for the
evaluation of tariff designs E1 - E4 (left hand side figures), and of the incentive
mechanisms E5 - E9 (right hand side figures).
1) Tariff designs (E1 - E4): according to Figure 3, upper-
left subfigure, the variable (volumetric) term of the distribution
tariff increases in a quicker fashion when the share of this term
in the two-part tariff design is large. Likewise, the deployment
of DER over time (Figure 3, lower-left subfigure), and the ac-
tual DER deployed capacity (Figure 4, upper subfigure) which
represents the counterpart to the growth of the distribution
tariff, increase in environments where the variable term in
the two-part design is more prominent. In Figure 5, we can
observe that the probability density functions of environments
E1 - E4 exhibit larger installation sizes for E1 (note that E1
and E6 represent the same environment) than E2, E3, and E4.
Finally, regarding the LCOE of the DER installations, the four












































Fig. 4. Cumulative sum of the size of the deployed DER installations
(including PV and batteries), over the discrete time dynamical system. The
upper figure corresponds to the evaluation of tariff designs, whereas the lower
one corresponds to the evaluation of the incentive mechanisms.








































Fig. 5. Gaussian kernel density estimation of the installed capacity of
PV (upper plot), and of batteries (lower plot). These figures represent the
probability density function for the kernel density estimation of PV and battery
capacities, for every environment (E1 - E9). This probability is computed
based on the calculated DER installation size of the set I.
cases costs are similar to the equivalent retail price. Note that
higher volume shares (E1) results in lower LCOEs.




























Fig. 6. Levelized cost of electricity of the prosumers in set I, for every
environment (E1 - E9).
2) Incentive mechanisms (E5 - E9): Figure 3, upper-right
subfigure, shows two different trends, one for the NM environ-
ment (E5), and another for the rest. E5 variable term outgrows
the other four by at least 5%, followed by E8, E7, E9, and E6 at
the end (n=10) of the simulation. The same trends are observed
in Figure 3, lower-right subfigure, which represents the total
DER penetration. However, examining the total capacities of
deployed DER (Figure 4, lower subfigure, and Figure 5), it is
visible that, despite the larger DER penetration, E5 results in
lower total capacity of deployed PV and batteries. Regarding
the LCOE, E5 displays a considerably lower LCOE than the
rest of the environments.
B. Discussion
1) Tariff designs (E1 - E4): we observe unity in the results,
by increasing the share of the variable term in the distribution
tariff, the business case to deploy DER installations improves,
thus facilitating the transition consumer → prosumer. This,
in turn, causes the distribution tariff to grow further in the
environments with higher share of variable term, indicating a
larger potential death spiral behaviour for those environments.
Hence, introducing a two-part design reduces the instability of
the system, as already highlighted in [31]. If we observe the
total amount of PV and battery deployed (Figure 4), we can
deduce that relying on distribution tariffs which are predom-
inantly volumetric results in larger deployed DER capacities.
This suggests a trade-off between DER penetration and total
capacity installed, and a distribution price spiral. Such a trade-
off must be addressed by policy makers in order to decide the
desired trend. Finally, since the incentive mechanism in place
(NB with a selling price of 0.04e/kWh) does not significantly
improve the DER business case, the four LCOEs are similar
to the equivalent retail price. The lowest LCOE corresponds
to E1, which is consistent with Figures 4 and 5.
2) Incentive mechanisms (E5 - E9): the different trends
observed for NM and NB are a consequence of the distinct
behaviour of prosumers they induce. With NM there is no
incentive to make a business case selling electricity or be-
coming self-sufficient. NM offers the perfect scenario for the
prosumers to adjust their production so that they import and
export equivalent amounts of energy (ξi,n = 0). For this rea-
son, the variable term in E5 (Figure 3), outgrows the other four
environments, since the apparent consumption with E5 is close
to zero, and the DSO needs to adjust the distribution tariff in
a larger extent. We may also note that, under NM, no batteries
are deployed (Figure 5). This is compatible with the findings in
[5], where the authors observe that, with this system, batteries
and imports are perfect substitutes. The low LCOE of E5 is
also consequence of the extremely low apparent consumption
of the prosumers under NM. In the other four environments,
the prosumers tend to deploy more PV and battery capacity
to reduce their imports. Interestingly, when the selling price
is high (E9), the prosumers rely on selling electricity as a
business case, not reducing their apparent consumption in the
same extent as E7 or E8. Hence, the increase in the distribution
tariff is not so prominent in E9. A new trade-off appears
between selling price and a distribution price spiral, where
both imply an extra burden for the community.
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the context of increasing decentralised electricity genera-
tion, this paper has evaluated the effects of different regulatory
frameworks on the evolution of DNs. ABM is used to simulate
the behaviour of the agents of a DN. To compute the DN
evolution, a discrete time dynamical system in which, at every
time step, the actions of the agents are evaluated, is used. In
the presented system, electricity consumers interacting with
a single DN are modelled as rational agents that may invest
in optimised distributed energy installations composed of PV
and/or batteries. The distribution tariff is adapted according to
the remuneration mechanism of the DSO.
We have designed and simulated four different examples
based on the type of tariff design, and five examples based
on the type of incentive mechanism employed to promote dis-
tributed generation. The results have been presented according
to four distinct metrics: (i) the evolution of the variable term of
the distribution tariff, (ii) the penetration of DER installations
relative to the maximum potential, (iii) the actual amount of
deployed PV and batteries, and (iv) the LCOE of the deployed
DER installations.
The results show that adding a fixed (capacity) term to
the tariff design, impairs the economic business case of the
consumers willing to deploy DER in the system. Furthermore,
using net-metering as incentive mechanism creates a potential
spiral of the distribution tariff, with a low integration of PV and
batteries in the system. When net-billing is used instead, the
spiral of prices may be more easily contained by controlling
the electricity selling prices. We observe a trade-off between
spiralling electricity prices and the desired penetration of PV
and batteries. Such trade-off may be tuned by policy makers by
adjusting key parameters such as the level of capacity charges,
or the selling price of electricity when net-billing is utilised.
To ensure the reproducibility of these results, the code
used to perform this evaluation (MILP, simulator, demand and
production profiles generation, and plots generation) can be
found as an electronic annex to this paper.1
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